Research Results
A eld with as long a history as computational scienti c discovery should have produced visible results, unless its workers are on a wrong track. There have been at least two research schools: one concerned with building models of human performance in science, and another concerned with building programs that are e ective players in science and which are free to use methods that are implausible in human terms, such as very large sequential searches. It is clear that the results achieved by these two research schools will di er. I will rst mention brie y some substantial achievements that have a ected basic theory in AI and beyond, and then some concrete achievements in domain sciences brought about by machine discovery. 1 First, the early work on Logic Theorist led directly to the basic theory of heuristic search in problem spaces, which emerged after analyzing the behavior of the program and other contemporary programs that demonstrated successful problem solving 25]. Second, the Dendral project resulted in the insight that the source of much problem-solving performance was speci c knowledge about a domain 21], contrary to the prevailing emphasis at the time on clever inference techniques 1 I will not make much e ort to trace the di erent goals that motivated workers on scienti c discovery. (A recent historical account of theorem proving 22] does follow this approach, and its examples overlap slightly with mine.) Instead, although acknowledging the diversity of goals, the discussion of the various research lines will be centered on how they feed the concerns of automated discovery.
which downplayed speci c domain knowledge. This insight led subsequently to the expert-systems movement at Stanford and elsewhere. A third example is the wide impact that the Carnegie Mellon discovery programs, described in the book Scienti c Discovery 18] , has had in furthering a cognitive-science approach to many of the lasting problems in the philosophy of science.
I now turn to examples of speci c discoveries that have been published in domain science journals, typically by those concerned with machine discovery rather than with modelling the human psychology of discovery. An early instance was the publication of rules for the fragmentation processes of several classes of ketoandrostanes in chemistry by the Meta-Dendral program 2]. Some more recent examples include conjectures in graph theory contributed by the Gra ti program authored by the mathematician S. Fajtlowicz at the University of Houston, one of which was later proved and published in the Journal of Graph Theory 4]. From my own work, a forthcoming article 39] in AI Magazine analyzes three human/computer discoveries in biology, chemistry, and physics; the best example therein of a machine discovery was enabled by the chemistry program MECHEM 37, 35] . Finally, the TETRAD project 30], carried out by philosophers at Carnegie Mellon, has automated the inference of linear causal models from observational data; at the Spring Symposium, C. Glymour described cases in which the program has improved on published causal models.
This brief overview shows that research on scienti c discovery has had signi cant impact on basic qualitative theory in arti cial intelligence and on peripheral elds such as the philosophy of science, and has led to published discoveries in domain sciences. Concerning the latter issue of published discoveries, there is still room for a program that \blows the lid o " some signi cant scienti c problem, to borrow a phrase used by E.A. Feigenbaum at the Stanford Spring Symposium. Nevertheless, there are results which can justify a claim on one of the \grand challenges" proposed by Carbonell in a 1992 editorial in Machine Learning 3]. Elsewhere I have made further observations on the future prospects of, and obstacles to, machine discovery in practice 38].
The Phenomena of Scienti c Inference
Research on scienti c discovery should be driven by empirical phenomena, i.e., by the inferential tasks that arise in scienti c practice. Of course, these inferential tasks are not static, but evolve over time. Nevertheless, research should demonstrate a degree of actual connection to real problems of scienti c inference.
In this sense, the eld of scienti c discovery is analogous to other empirical sub elds of arti cial intelligence such as robotics, vision, natural language processing, speech, and so on, which are motivated by actual problems of a robot or program sensing the world or handling human speech or written language. The rst question to ask about a piece of vision research is what is learned about the problem of sensing and acting within a visual environment. Similarly, the rst question to demand of scienti c discovery research is what practical problem of scienti c inference is being elucidated.
The strong emphasis on generality that is often found in machine learning, or generally in AI, should be a secondary concern in the eld of scienti c discovery. Rather than being a metaphysical constraint on research projects, generality should emerge from the practical business of automating tasks of scienti c inference. Propositions or principles of a limited, but useful, degree of generality should not be disdained because they fall short of universal scope. To do otherwise is to disregard the incremental character of science, and to hamper the eld by postponing useful and illuminating partial results until the advent of a universal theory of everything, which may or may not arrive.
Computer Science Research
Here I will examine computer science (CS) research on scienti c discovery, by which I mean research that computer scientists are in a special position to carry out. Of course, the intent is not to exclude others from this activity, but to describe and explicate a research direction whose values and methods fall squarely within the tradition of research in computer science.
Evaluation of Research Quality
How is computer-science research on scienti c discovery to be evaluated? A typical research contribution consists of building a program that newly automates (perhaps partially) some task of scienti c reasoning, or that traverses an interesting distance in that direction. The reality and signi cance of the program's task are often in question, since computer science reviewers cannot be expected to know enough about the many scienti c domains that may be explored by discovery research. A program's novelty is another issue, since domain scientists are themselves writing creative and complex computer programs in support of their activities, which may not be known to a computer scientist.
An obvious means to acquire positive evidence for reality, signi cance, and novelty is, therefore, to publish the work in a journal of the relevant scienti c domain. Of course, this requires the exibility to write for a di erent audience, and will also imply some overlap with publication in discovery forums, but the overall bene ts are clear: validation of the work, impact on the science, external visibility for discovery research, and the chance to gain new sources of collaborators, or new data to run a program on. The Stanford DENDRAL project set the standard for co-publication in computer and natural science 20].
By no means does such a practice imply an ethically dubious re-publication of the same material, since the distinct audiences will want to read rather di erent descriptions, and the link to precursor literature will also be di erent. Ideally, one publication is enough to inform the world of a contribution, but the pragmatics are di erent and will likely remain so.
The issue of novel scope is crucial, since it is quite possible to write useful and worthwhile programs in support of scienti c discovery without demonstrating new scope for computing. For example, in elds where computers are already major players, the contribution of a new program will, by itself, add little to our understanding of what in science can be automated. There are certain areas within molecular biology and symbolic mathematics, for example, where computer programs are already dominant. Therefore, to demonstrate novel scope in molecular biology, one would need to tackle an unexplored type of inference that arises there, rather than demonstrate an incremental improvement over existing programs. 2 The property of novel scope generally correlates with surprisingness: if a 2 Of course, the incremental improvement may be relevant to a broader issue. My point assumes the absence of mixed audience of informed computer and domain scientists is generally surprised by the fact of a discovery program and its achievements, then the program displays novel scope for computing.
How NOT to Judge Quality
This section will examine some fallacious judgments about discovery research which have been gleaned over the years from a variety of sources, including reviews of work by this author and his colleagues.
Frequently, the standard review forms for publication outlets in elds of AI assume that submissions are contributing a new general method, from which it follows that the submitter must give evidence why the method is an improvement over previous methods, why it is domain independent, and so on. This pigeon-holing of research contributions must not be the standard for discovery research. If it were, it would be highly ironic, since an acquaintance with the practice of science teaches that a variety of types of contribution are capable of advancing knowledge of a eld, ranging from new methods and techniques, to formal and qualitative theory, informed conjecture, new positive or negative evidence about previous proposals, success stories, syntheses, and reviews. At this early stage (historically speaking) of discovery research, no standard research schemata should be legislated.
If the methods that are used in a discovery program have precedents, and thus are not invented speci cally for their use in the program, this does not imply that the work is not novel or signi cant; these are independent issues. Finding a match between scienti c problems and existing methods is a valuable contribution. For example, a discovery program may represent a \clever use of heuristic search", and heuristic search is a familiar method of AI, but this fact does not detract from the contribution, which lies in identifying new scope for computing in discovery. Quite the contrary, the successful use of simple, familiar methods such as heuristic search is desirable, since it points to a desirable pattern of simplicity in the phenomena of interest: scienti c inference. Conversely, novel methods that have an unknown link to actual science should seek other outlets for publication.
It is not a devastating criticism to point out that a discovery program is not completely autonomous, just as it is not a devastating criticism of the co-author of a scienti c paper to point out that the co-author had co-workers. The wider the autonomy of the program, the better, but the realistic goal of achieving at least incremental progress demands that we not set our standards too high.
Given that science is an incremental process, it is always the case that a research contribution presupposes some already-solved problems. For example, the work of most AI scientists presupposes the existence of computers, whose basic design was worked out in mid-century. Likewise, it is irrelevant to accuse discovery research of relying on previously-solved problems, e.g., of a program not deciding by itself what are the possibly relevant variables or data, since all science is similarly reliant on the work of predecessors. The key question is whether one identi es new scope for computing, or otherwise elucidates some incompletely-understood question about discovery. There are no \essences" in science that foolhardy discovery researchers pare away, there is only the issues of whether a speci c problem of scienti c inference is real, poorly understood, and hence interesting to automate. this separate motivation.
From a computer-science standpoint that is concerned with automation, how scientists accomplish a given task is logically irrelevant, although possibly of great heuristic value. A valid approach to automation can and has in many cases been based on a logical analysis of the heuristic relation between data and discovery, and not on any psychological analysis.
Finally, it is too much to ask of every discovery research that it contribute a new discovery in science. There are many circumstantial obstacles to making a machine discovery, such as gaining access to promising data or even any data, and these need not be overcome as a prerequisite to publication; the justi cation is, again, the incremental character of scienti c research in general. However, one can and should inquire about such results periodically, and I have given a brief but signi cant answer above. Another objection against the lofty criterion of requiring scienti c discoveries is that it would rule out theoretical, conceptual, and psycho-historical work, which would be most undesirable.
Related Fields
Computer science research on scienti c discovery is related to, and in uenced by, various other independent, intersecting, or superordinate elds. Below I propose some ways to construe this relation.
Relation to Machine Learning
Research on scienti c discovery is often considered a sub eld of machine learning. Some of the reasons for this were discussed in editorials by Langley 16] and by Langley and Michalski 17] in the journal Machine Learning. Among his reasons were that many discovery researchers have also worked in more mainstream machine learning, and that both elds share a concern with the formulation of general law-like rules from data.
Langley's points are accurate, but a di culty is that the inferential problems that arise in scienti c practice include much more than the data-driven induction of rules and laws, which has been a major focus of ML research. Moreover, ML researchers have been quite concerned with generality, and less concerned with learning or discovery problems which require a substantial dose of domaindependent elements to achieve a competent system. Scienti c problems, on the other hand, abound in domain-dependent aspects, hence the tension. While generality, e cacy, elegance and so on are universal goods, the persistent reality is that science is an incremental process, and one has to choose what aspects will receive emphasis. The argument here is that the emphasis in scienti c discovery research should be on e cacy and novel scope rst and generality second. 3 A further issue is that much scienti c discovery work does not even t Simon's classic de nition of machine learning 29], according to which a program learns if it improves its performance on the basis of its own experience. A xed program that is highly competent in some aspect of science (the Mathematica program, say) would not be a machine learning program, but may automate a very important class of tasks in science and engineering.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that scienti c discovery is not a sub eld of machine learning, much less a mere applications sub eld, but is instead a separate sub eld of AI which will continue to share common elements with machine learning.
Relation to Computational Science
A critical question is the relationship of discovery research to the computational research that scientists themselves increasingly carry out. One could make an analogy with the problem faced by academic computer architects: what research should be carried out in the face of a large, dynamic, and resource-rich computer industry? There are many scientists at work developing computer programs to support their work; what comparative advantage do computer scientists working in scienti c discovery have?
Part of the answer is this: of all the disciplines, computer scientists are, or should be, the most quali ed to perceive new scope for computing in any sphere, since they, generally speaking, are armed (in their heads) with the most computational tools and are best capable of developing the complex algorithms and programs that many tasks require. There are, of course, notable exceptions, such as Lederberg's innovative development of the rst algorithm to generate molecular structures, which led to the DENDRAL project.
To carry out discovery research, computer scientists must be aware of scienti c practice enough to identify novel scope for computing, and they should also be armed with su cient applied mathematics and statistics, which clearly also nd wide scope within science. Given the current state of a airs, computer scientists are likely to nd the most novel scope within inference, since still today the common perception is that the role of computers within science is largely con ned to modelling, not inference. This perception prevails despite the numerous successful counterexamples such as the inferential tasks automated by Mathematica or by the many programs of molecular biology, e.g., those that infer similarities between DNA strings or that infer phylogenetic trees. This perception is even fostered by some computer scientists: A recent article in Communications of the ACM 31] actually de nes computational science in terms of modelling, thus completely ignoring inference, which is the larger of the two spheres. Most of what goes on in science is reasoning of some sort or another, not modelling Nature.
An example may clarify the intended distinction between inference and modelling: my MECHEM program in chemistry (cited earlier) reasons in the course of nding a model of a reaction mechanism. The reasoning that leads to a model does not itself model any natural process. If a second program simulates the behavior of a model found by MECHEM using the laws of chemical kinetics, then this second program is modelling Nature. Similarly, any other program that searches a space of models is carrying out inference. The broader scope belongs to the class of programs that reason, not to the class of programs that model Nature.
Besides an emphasis on novel scope, another realm of comparative advantage can be a concern with generality across scienti c domains, since a computer scientist is not necessarily tied to a speci c discipline for reasons of training and colleagues. There are strong generic elements in science, i.e., an inferential problem in one science very often has strong analogues in another science, so that there is a potential for the sharing of design knowledge and of formulating concepts and propositions that pertain to classes of scienti c tasks. Elsewhere I have argued this point in more detail by articulating the concept of a generic scienti c task 36].
In brief, the dimensions of likely comparative advantage for computer science research on scienti c discovery lie in perceiving novel scope for computing and in formulating general knowledge about computing in science. The prerequisites for ful lling this potential are a close attention to scienti c practice, a willingness to enter deeply into scienti c problems as the opportunity warrants, and a broad acquaintance with the intellectual tools of algorithms, arti cial intelligence, applied mathematics, and statistics.
Relation to Computer Science
The relation of research on scienti c discovery to basic computer science is an important issue. CS-oriented workers should not be viewed as doing something other than computer science, but instead expanding what doing computer science means. The subject matter of a eld changes over time; one can browse the Communications of the ACM of the 1960's and contrast its contents with present-day CS research to get an idea, even without seeking analogies to other elds with longer and more evolved histories.
An intellectual, CS-oriented justi cation of discovery research is as follows. A very interesting question about computers is: What is their scope, what are their limits? This question can be studied theoretically and abstractly or practically.
To study it practically is to show that the scope of computers is wider than is ordinarily perceived, even by experts. This demonstration proceeds by building systems to automate practical a airs. The quality of the (basic) research correlates with the surprisingness of the achievements that are enabled by the program.
Practical a airs include science, art, programming, chess, and so on, i.e., a airs that are pursued with some seriousness by people (tic-tac-toe and naughts-and-cross are not practical a airs). To obtain solid achievements will often require going deeply into other domains, which then accounts for the interdisciplinary character of such work. But, this character does not detract from the real, disciplinary CS content.
Relation to Psycho-Historical Approaches
Much of the work on scienti c discovery has followed a psychological or cognitive-science approach, by which I mean it has been constrained by behavioral or historical data or laws (for example, the sheer amount of sequential computation should not exceed human capabilities). From a CS viewpoint that emphasizes algorithms and automation, the value of such psycho-historical work includes: (1) uncovering new scienti c tasks to focus on; (2) contributing new concepts with which to reason about and describe scienti c inference; and (3) elucidating the heuristics that scientists follow, especially on highly qualitative tasks that appear to be open-ended or ill-structured. I will illustrate these types of contributions with the following examples.
(1) The book Scienti c Discovery by Langley et al. 18 ] is a cognitive-science study of historical discovery tasks, taken mostly from the early history of chemistry. The authors pointed out that some tasks of model building in particle physics are analogous to the tasks that are modelled in their book. Kocabas 14] followed up on their suggestion and reported the rst program that modelled the discovery of conservation laws in particle physics. In turn, I followed up on Kocabas by reporting a more systematic approach to the same task 34]. In parallel, I published an account for a physicist audience 40] in order to gain external validation of reality and signi cance, as has been recommended above.
(2) An early paper by Lea and Simon 19] is often cited as an account of the dual-space nature of rule induction, which is a laboratory-psychology task that is somewhat analogous to the scientist's task of inducing general rules from experimental data. The notion of dual-space search, which has been elaborated by further cognitive-science studies (e.g., 12]), provides a basic concept with which to describe the diversity of reasoning tasks that confront the scientist. This concept has not shown up in the CS-oriented literature that focuses on inferential tasks involving a single problem space, but the concept has proved valuable for describing more open-ended tasks.
A second example of the use of psychological concepts within machine discovery can be drawn from my own work. A forthcoming article 39] reports a general pattern within several recent human/computer discoveries, and makes use of the Newell/Simon concept of a representation 24] to express this pattern: each of the discoveries involved a change in the representation of a scienti c task.
(3) There have been many projects that deeply studied historical cases of discovery in order to elucidate the heuristics and problem spaces that scientists may have followed. For example, A. Gordon et al. studied the discovery of structural models for solutions in the history of chemistry 8], Tweney examined in detail Michael Faraday's notebooks 33], Holmes did likewise for Hans Krebs's discoveries in biochemistry 11], Kulkarni and Simon built a cognitive model of Krebs's urea-cycle discovery based on Holmes's work 15], and Thagard and Nowak studied the evolving conceptual structures during the develop of plate tectonics in geology 32]; many other similar projects could be cited. More recently, Dunbar has studied the reasoning strategies employed by working molecular biologists after spending many months at several of their research labs 6].
There seems to be much potential for such work to in uence directly the design of computational actors in science practice. An obstacle to be overcome is that the discovery episodes addressed by these projects are often rather di use and special, so that extracting a promising task to automate, e.g., one that recurs in scienti c practice, is not easy. Earlier, Newell explored in depth some of these di culties, in the context of making use of G. Polya's heuristics for mathematical discovery within an AI system 23].
Conclusion
This essay has examined brie y the history of research on the inferential problems that arise in science and mathematics, emphasizing the viewpoint of computer science (i.e., automation) and also problems of creative scienti c reasoning rather than the modelling of Nature. I have also analyzed the relation of CS-oriented discovery research to peripheral elds that either share an interest in the phenomena of science or share some of the methods of approach. The important issue of evaluating research quality has been tied to the fundamental problems of the eld, such as extending the realm of computing within scienti c practice at its most creative levels.
I close this essay with some brief recommendations. First, workers in this area should become familiar with a wide variety of intellectual tools, including the basic tools of the qualitative theory of AI and heuristic search, combinatorial algorithms, and applied mathematics. This is the best equipment for perceiving new scope for computational scienti c discovery. An acquaintance with peripheral elds such as the psychology and philosophy of science (e.g., 27]) will have signi cant heuristic value as well. A willingness to penetrate deeply into the content of scienti c problems is important.
Second, the primary questions that reviewers of new scienti c discovery programs should pose is derived from the comparative advantage of computer scientists that was discussed above: (1) what new scope for computing in science is convincingly demonstrated? and (2) is there (some) generality within science? By no means should these be the sole questions; instead, the intent is to contrast them with a frequent alternative: what new AI method is proposed? Of course, the ideally best work would accomplish everything: demonstrate new scope, apply to a broad range of science, enable a new scienti c discovery, incorporate an unprecedented method, etc.
Third, describing a new program is not the only way to advance the (computer) science of scienti c discovery. There is a need for theory, either qualitative or more formal, that will enable general concepts and propositions concerning the role of computing in science.
Finally, the research program that this essay has developed will hasten the interesting and desirable disciplinary transformations that were foreseen a decade ago by Allen Newell 1]:
We should, by the way, be prepared for some radical, and perhaps surprising, transformations of the disciplinary structure of science (technology included) as information processing pervades it. In particular, as we become more aware of the detailed information processes that go on in doing science, the sciences will nd themselves increasingly taking a metaposition, in which doing science (observing, experimenting, theorizing, testing, archiving, ...) will involve understanding these information processes, and building systems that do the object-level science. Then the boundaries between the enterprise of science as a whole (the acquisition and organization of the knowledge of the world) and AI (the understanding of how knowledge is acquired and organized) will become increasingly fuzzy.
